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Training Responsible Journalists in
China: Guiding Domestic Opinion,
Gaining Foreign Audiences 
Laura DOMBERNOWSKY 
Abstract: The teaching of international journalism in China serves a 
dual purpose: to train professionals who can strengthen the country’s 
international media and to guide domestic opinion on international 
issues. This article follows one class of students at Tsinghua Univer-
sity in Beijing and investigates how they are taught to gain foreign 
audiences, stay loyal to the party line, protect national interests at 
home and abroad, and be critical of foreign media reports. On this 
basis, the article discusses how the concept of professionalism, within 
the specific context of international journalism, is contested by com-
peting views on what it means to be a responsible journalist. 
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Introduction 
“I don’t know if I have been brainwashed by Tsinghua or China, but 
I really think the media should serve the interests of the country,” 
argued Wang Guomei, a student of international journalism and 
communications at Tsinghua University, in our first interview (An-
onymous 1 2012). It was not surprising that she expressed an obliga-
tion to serve her country. As an elite student and a party member, she 
had been taught this throughout her life. At the age of 24, she had 
been subjected to the national “Patriotic Education Campaign,” 
which was launched in 1991 and aimed to use  
history education as an instrument for the glorification of the par-
ty, for the consolidation of the PRC’s national identity, and for the 
justification of the political system of the CCP’s one-party rule. 
(Wang 2008: 784) 
Wang Guomei had consciously accepted her role of serving state 
interests. But when we met again more than one year later, her views 
had changed (Anonymous 1 2013). Through internships, intensive 
reading of Western media, and classes in English news writing, she 
had gained insight into how a lack of respect for professional judge-
ment posed risks to the quality of reporting. She had started question-
ing whether or not the media should be used as a vehicle to serve 
state interests.  
Over a period of almost two years, I followed a group of Chi-
nese students who studied international journalism and communica-
tions. The transition that Wang Guomei went through illustrates the 
double bind she and her fellow students felt caught in when balanc-
ing the ideological imperatives of their education – to be critical of 
foreign media, to stay loyal to the party line, and to protect national 
interests at home and abroad – with the need to attract foreign audi-
ences by providing trustworthy, well-told, and convincing media re-
ports to domestic and international audiences. During internships, 
through reading Western theories of journalism, and by following 
Western media coverage, the students were exposed to ideals of pro-
fessionalism that did not correspond with what they were taught in 
class: they started questioning what it means to be a professional, 
responsible journalist in China today.  
The main aim of this article is to explore how competing percep-
tions of professionalism in Chinese journalism are articulated locally 
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in teaching and how they are interpreted by students of international 
journalism and communications. To support this, I first give an over-
view of the historical and institutional set-up of international journal-
ism and communications education in China and explain how this 
differs from journalism teaching in China at large. After introducing 
my interviewees, I go on to examine the Chinese discourse on inter-
national journalism in order to outline the academic and ideological 
contexts of my interviewees’ university training. On this basis, I will 
discuss how the official construct of professionalism in the specific 
context of international journalism is challenged by the concurrent 
attempt to attract foreign audiences.  
Training International Media Talent 
When Chinese universities reopened in 1978 after the turbulence of 
the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), journalism education was 
quickly re-established around the country as an extension of existing 
Chinese literature and English departments. Parallel to this develop-
ment, US-inspired curriculum content was reintroduced into Chinese 
journalism education by educators from Taiwan and Hong Kong, and 
through direct interactions with educational institutions in the United 
States (Yong and Lee 2009). Chinese journalism education is entirely 
under the administration of the Ministry of Education (MoE). The 
curriculum and design of course content follow the party line. Across 
different journalism schools in China there is, however, a huge variety 
in how and what practical skills are taught to journalism students, and 
whether or not they have internships, and for how long. According to 
Guo Zhongshi, individual lecturers have some degree of autonomy in 
deciding teaching content (Guo 2010). 
As early as 1978, a bilingual (English/Chinese) course in journal-
ism education had been established at the Chinese Academy of Sci-
ences. Similar programmes soon spread to other universities and this 
trend, along with the overall expansion of Chinese journalism educa-
tion in the 1990s, persisted (Guo 2004). To further enhance China’s 
international communication work, in 2009, the MoE and the Publici-
ty Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central 
Committee (ѝޡѝཞᇓՐ䜘, zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu) identi-
fied Tsinghua University, Renmin University of China (People’s Uni-
versity of China), the Communication University of China, Beijing 
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Foreign Studies University, and Fudan University in Shanghai as pilot 
universities to set up master’s degree programmes in international 
journalism and communications. In 2011 the number of universities 
in the programme was reduced to three when Fudan University and 
Beijing Foreign Studies University exited the initiative. This strength-
ening of the training of journalists with a specialisation in internation-
al journalism and communications reflects the overall strengthening 
of the fields of international communications and public diplomacy in 
China (Brady 2012). Along with China’s increasing involvement in 
international affairs, the country has become more sensitive about 
how it is portrayed in the world. In order to limit the risks of global 
interaction and maximise its influence, the party-state relies on 
strengthening communications control through the Chinese propa-
ganda system (Edney 2014). In recent years, China has upgraded the 
ministry spokesperson system (Chen 2011), initiated soft power and 
public diplomacy strategies (Barr 2011, 2012; Wang 2011), and in-
vested in Chinese media organisations with a global outreach (Xin 
2012).  
The elements that make these MA programmes in international 
journalism and communications different from other journalism pro-
grammes with an emphasis on language training are, first, their close 
cooperation with China’s state-owned media organisations with a 
global outreach – China Central Television (CCTV), Xinhua News 
Agency, China News Service (CNS), People’s Daily, China Daily, and China 
Radio International (CRI) – and, second, their official endorsement 
from the party organs and state departments responsible for interna-
tional communications: the Publicity Department of the CCP Central 
Committee, the State Council Information Office, and the Infor-
mation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This official 
backing of Tsinghua University’s programme was emphasised in the 
call for applicants put out by the university’s School of Journalism 
and Communication: “The programme receives strong support from 
the relevant ministries, media and the university with regard to teach-
ing, internships, and employment” (Tsinghua University 2011). 
During the two years’ training provided by Tsinghua University, 
this cooperation with both state institutions and state media mani-
fests itself through the mandatory internships that students take with 
one of the associated media outlets and through lectures given 
throughout the programme by experienced state media journalists 
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and government public relations workers. For instance, when I visit-
ed Tsinghua University in the autumn semester of 2011, lectures were 
given and whole courses were taught by the deputy director of the 
General Administration of Press and Publication (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭᯠ
䰫ࠪ⡸ᙫ㖢, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo xinwen chuban zongshu, GAPP), 
Li Dongdong; Xinhua News Agency journalist Si Jiuyue (Si had previ-
ously worked for Xinhua’s Los Angeles office); Duan Jiyong from 
Xinhua’s International News Editorial Office; and CRI editor Guan 
Juanjuan. This cooperation with state institutions and central media 
organisations served to gradually introduce students to future careers 
as journalists within China’s state media outlets or as PR workers in 
government agencies. When the MA programme was launched in 
2009, Xinhua News Agency praised the training of “top talents of inter-
national journalism and communications” who can serve “main-
stream media of international propaganda” (Xinhua 2009). Although 
the Xinhua news story highlighted the programme’s international 
journalism training only in relation to global audiences, my fieldwork 
at Tsinghua University showed that the reporting of international 
news to domestic audiences was an equally important aspect of the 
school’s teaching.  
Tsinghua University Is Red 
This research followed one class of students at the prestigious Tsing-
hua University in Beijing who were enrolled in the two-year MA pro-
gramme in International Journalism and Communication (ഭ䱵ᯠ䰫
Ր᫝, guoji xinwen chuanbo) in the autumn of 2011 and who graduated 
in either 2013 or 2014. I conducted the first interviews during the 
autumn of 2011 and early winter of 2012 and the second round of 
interviews in the spring of 2013, after the students had completed 
their mandatory internships. In-depth interviews were conducted 
with 12 out of the 24 students, and all students have been given 
pseudonyms in this paper. As a visiting PhD student to Tsinghua 
University in autumn 2011, I was allowed to observe all classes in 
journalism and communications. This study is based on a combina-
tion of content analysis of teaching material, class observations, stu-
dent assignments, and interviews with students and lecturers.  
Most national university rankings consistently place Tsinghua 
University as one of the top two universities in China. Several of 
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China’s political leaders, including President Xi Jinping, former presi-
dent Hu Jintao, and former premier Zhu Rongji, were educated at 
Tsinghua, giving the university a special reputation for being close to 
the political elite. In the interviews I conducted with journalism stu-
dents in Beijing between 2011 and 2013, Tsinghua University’s jour-
nalism students were often identified as being “different.” According 
to their peers, Tsinghua University’s journalism students were “closer 
to the party line” or were described, in even less flattering terms, as 
being “less open-minded.” My Tsinghua interviewees were familiar 
with this reputation and did not reject it. When one Tsinghua interna-
tional journalism and communications master’s student I interviewed 
compared Tsinghua University to the university in Shandong where 
she obtained her undergraduate degree in journalism, she said, 
“Tsinghua is red and concentrates its efforts on the party” (Anonym-
ous 1 2012). To my interviewees, this meant that being “a good stu-
dent” at Tsinghua was not only about doing one’s best academically. 
It was also about having a certain ideological understanding.  
When launching its MA programme in International Journalism 
and Communication, Tsinghua University emphasised that the stu-
dents would be trained to have 
a high degree of social responsibility, historical commitment, pro-
fessional pride, and a pragmatic and innovative spirit. They should 
understand China’s history and culture, have insight into China’s 
national conditions, and understand the global trends. (Tsinghua 
University 2009) 
According to the application criteria of Tsinghua University’s School 
of Journalism and Communication, the programme is directed to-
wards students who hold a BA in language studies, international pol-
itics, journalism, or communications; have a high proficiency in Eng-
lish; have demonstrated academic excellence and rank among the top 
5 per cent of their class; have good communication skills and strong 
organisational skills; are “keenly interested” in studying international 
communications; and aim to work within this field (Tsinghua Univer-
sity 2011). 
The students in this study performed very well academically. 
They all had a high proficiency in English and/or other foreign lan-
guages. My interviewees appeared highly motivated to study and were 
generally well prepared for class. The educational backgrounds of the 
students varied. Some had a BA in journalism, others in foreign lan-
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guages or Chinese literature. Some had obtained a BA degree from 
Tsinghua or other universities in Beijing, while others had graduated 
from other top universities in China, such as Zhejiang University. 
The majority of the students in the programme were party members 
and came from families where at least one parent was a party mem-
ber.  
My interviewees were highly skilled, motivated, and career-
driven. However, when applying for this particular MA programme, 
most of them said they had not decided whether or not they wanted a 
career in journalism, in PR, or in something completely unrelated to 
their major. What had attracted them to this programme was that it 
appeared to have official recognition and provided qualified teaching 
and opportunities for internships – and potentially employment – in 
one of China’s central media or government offices. In China’s in-
creasingly competitive job market, this MA seemed like a degree with 
a guaranteed job at the end of it. The students had also been attracted 
to the fact that they would obtain a high level of both Chinese and 
English communication skills.  
After graduation in the summer of 2013, 12 out of the 24 gradu-
ates were employed as journalists. Three were employed as journalists 
in the editorial office for international news at Xinhua News Agency 
and three others were hired as journalists covering domestic news, 
also for Xinhua. Two were employed as journalists for CCTV and one 
for People’s Daily, while the rest were employed as journalists for mu-
nicipal- and provincial-level media. Of the remaining 12 who did not 
become journalists, one entered the Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭཆӔ䜘, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo waijiaobu) 
and one entered the Ministry of Commerce (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ୶࣑䜘, 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo shangwubu). Five graduates entered differ-
ent state-owned enterprises. The remaining five graduates were em-
ployed by private companies in China or enrolled in PhD pro-
grammes in the United States. With only three graduates out of the 
24 in jobs directly related to international journalism and one in a job 
related to foreign affairs, the students’ career choices did not seem to 
correspond well with the programme’s aim of producing international 
media talent. But with time, it is possible that, as they climb their 
career ladders, the graduates employed by CCTV and Xinhua may 
eventually be transferred to those organisations’ respective editorial 
offices for international news. 
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External Propaganda and Protection of National 
Interests
Along with the introduction of market reforms in the 1980s, China 
began to establish a bureaucratic apparatus to strengthen communica-
tions and information targeted towards the world outside China. The 
CCP distinguishes between internal propaganda (ሩ޵ᇓՐ , duinei 
xuanchuan) and external propaganda (ሩཆᇓՐ, duiwai xuanchuan). In 
the beginning, this distinction was primarily based on the logic that 
not all information about domestic issues was suitable for a foreign 
audience and that, likewise, the Chinese public should have limited 
access to information from abroad (Brady 2009). Still today, China’s 
international state media serve the dual role of filtering and delivering 
international news to a domestic audience and disseminating specific 
news and information about China and the country’s official stance 
on domestic and international issues to the world. Edney (2014) as-
serts that China’s international state media are both inward- and out-
ward-looking. This means that, when reporting on international news 
to the domestic audience, Chinese journalists have to keep public 
sentiment in mind and guide public opinion towards the party line. 
Conversely, when reporting to an international audience, they are 
required to give China an official voice, while at the same time report-
ing in a way that does not scare foreign audiences away (Edney 2014).  
As an attempt to break with what China regards as a stereotyped 
and largely negative narrative in the foreign media that ignores the 
positive accomplishments of the country, China is determined to 
strengthen its international media. This determination has, according 
to Lu Yiyi, “sprung from its belief that Western media cannot be 
trusted to portray China in an objective manner” (Lu 2012: 104). In 
his speech at the General Debate of the 65th Session of the United 
Nations’ General Assembly, former premier Wen Jiabao called for a 
better understanding of what he termed the “real China” (ⵏᇎⲴѝഭ, 
zhenshi de Zhongguo). He emphasised that China is “firmly committed 
to peaceful development” and wants to “contribute to world peace 
through [its] development” (MFA 2010, official translation). In order 
to strengthen China’s international media, Li Changchun, former 
member of the Politburo Standing Committee (Standing Committee 
of the Central Political Bureau of the CCP, ѝഭޡӗފѝཞ᭯⋫ተᑨ
࣑ငઈՊ, Zhongguo Gongchandang zhongyang zhengzhiju changwu weiyuan-
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hui), responsible for media, in his speech to celebrate the 50th anni-
versary of the CCTV, encouraged the Chinese media to  
strive to be the first to use our voice, communicate our view-
points, win the right to speak, and take control of actions and con-
tinuously strengthen the authority and impact of our mainstream 
media. (Li 2008) 
However, Chinese efforts to portray “the real China” to the world are 
often met with a great deal of scepticism. As Barr says, China needs 
to develop sufficient communication skills to convince audiences 
abroad: “As is often the case in China, the software must catch up 
with the hardware” (Barr 2011: 57). 
Professionalism with Chinese Characteristics 
In the literature, the concept of professionalism is often directly ap-
plied to the Chinese context without clarifying what professionalism 
means. In their study of job satisfaction among Chinese journalists, 
Chan et al. argue that Chinese journalists are in the process of profes-
sionalisation and that they are  
import[ing] the Western vocabulary of professional journalism in-
to China’s local context. [They point out that there is] a deep-
rooted commitment to the interests of the public, to quality jour-
nalism based on the principle of factuality, and to practices con-
sistent with ethical principles [among Chinese journalists]. (Chan, 
Pan, and Lee 2004: 256) 
But the literature does not sufficiently clarify how the concept of 
professionalism is interpreted in China. As Polumbaum has formulat-
ed it, “One major challenge is figuring out just what professionalism 
or its Chinese equivalents might mean to Chinese practitioners, 
scholars, and officials” (Polumbaum 2011: 210). An excellent ex-
ample of how Western definitions of values and standards of journal-
ism are interpreted in a local context can be seen in Jennifer Hasty’s 
work on the journalistic practices of journalists in Ghana. She shows 
that the values, criteria of newsworthiness, and narrative techniques 
taught in journalism schools are all “locally determined by Ghanaian 
standards of discourse and sociality” (Hasty 2006: 69). 
In the official Chinese discourse on articulating professional ideals, 
Pan and Lu point out that the term professional (уъ, zhuanye) is 
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often used in conjunction with terms such as “quality” (㍐䍘, suzhi) 
and “training” (䇝㓳, xunlian) (Pan and Lu 2003). According to the 
Chinese ethical code, some of the qualities that Chinese journalists 
should be officially trained in are “societal responsibility” (⽮Պ䍓ԫ, 
shehui zeren) and an “understanding of the greater cause” (བྷተ᜿䇶, 
daju yishi). Furthermore, the ethical code emphasises the need for 
journalists to respect national interests and the socialist cause (ACJA 
2009). This means that Chinese professions are expected to have a 
cooperative relationship with dominant political institutions, rather 
than acting as independent supervisory bodies (Alford and Winston 
2011). In the following, I will show how Chinese journalism students 
are instructed to become responsible professionals who are supposed 
to gain foreign audiences, be loyal to the party line, protect national 
interests at home and abroad, and be critical of foreign news reports 
about China.  
At Tsinghua University’s MA in journalism and communications, 
the teaching was not textbook-based, but instead used a combination 
of exercises, lecturers’ handouts, and suggested readings of interna-
tional scholars – for example, Joseph Nye and Mark Deuze. Based on 
my own participation in class, interviews with lecturers, and a review 
of their PowerPoint presentations and handouts, I observed that 
students were instructed to become responsible professionals who 
should serve Chinese interests.  
Gaining Foreign Audiences 
In his speech to the students of international journalism and commu-
nications at the Communication University of China in 2010, Li 
Changchun stated that journalism students should look for inspira-
tion from abroad and “grasp the work of international communica-
tion by the roots,” but they should never forget their “strong ideo-
logical spirit” (Li 2010).  
By deliberately borrowing from Western methods of communi-
cation, China has, according to Brady, successfully restrengthened 
state propaganda to become more “market-friendly, scientific, high-
tech, and politics-lite” (Brady 2012: 1). In the classes I observed, it 
was frequently pointed out that the Chinese media needed to improve 
their credibility (ਟؑᓖ, kexindu) and influence (ᖡ૽࣋, yingxiangli) by 
adhering to the principles of reporting truthfully, accurately, compre-
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hensively, and objectively – and by being among the first to report on 
international issues.  
In the Chinese discourse on international journalism and com-
munications, it is generally acknowledged that Chinese journalists and 
media workers need a profound knowledge and understanding of the 
culture and history of other countries in order for them to be able to 
adopt a journalistic style that foreign audiences are familiar with and 
are more likely to be sympathetic towards. They are encouraged to 
win the hearts and minds of foreign readers, listeners, and viewers: 
“China’s international journalists have to learn to tell stories about 
China in a way that foreigners can relate to,” argued PR advisor and 
vice president of the China International Public Relations Association 
(ѝഭഭ䱵ޜޡޣ㌫ॿՊ, Zhongguo guoji gonggong guanxi xiehui, CIPRA), 
Dong Guanpeng who taught the class of international journalism
(Dong 2011). Furthermore, Dong pointed to the crucial challenge for 
China’s state media: presenting news reports that simultaneously 
improve party legitimacy and strengthen the credibility of China’s 
state media. “How can we make the party’s voice the most resound-
ing? And how can we make information from the government the 
most trustworthy?” (Dong 2011) This predicament is central to Chi-
na’s international state media, which seeks both to give China an 
official voice and improve the party’s image at home and abroad and 
to deliver news and information in a timely and comprehensive man-
ner.  
Staying Loyal to the Party Line 
The ideological framework of socialism with Chinese characteris-
tics should unremittingly arm our students’ brains and guide our 
students to have strong ideals and beliefs and always stick to the 
correct political orientation. (Li 2010) 
In class, the students were instructed in the different social and politi-
cal aspects of international newsmaking that Chinese journalists are 
expected to consider with regard to determining what and how to 
report. The students learned that defining newsworthiness in a Chi-
nese context is never only a matter of professional judgement of the 
story’s timeliness, proximity, novelty, impact, usefulness, and so on, 
but requires an understanding and acknowledgment of political prior-
ities and strategic national interests.  
  186 Laura Dombernowsky 

My interviewees were taught to be careful with terminology, 
since any inappropriate choice of language could have “fatal conse-
quences.” As with the tricky business of diplomatic language, the 
language used by Chinese state media to report on sensitive issues 
also demands a careful choice of wording and formulation (ᨀ⌅, tifa) 
(Schoenhals 1992). Furthermore, to prepare them for future em-
ployment as journalists or PR workers, students were instructed to 
identify the political stance of party organs or government offices and 
to pay close attention to the wordings of texts and speeches. As 
Schoenhals (1992) notes in his work on formalised language in con-
temporary Chinese politics,  
By proscribing some formulations while prescribing others, they 
set out to regulate what is being said and what is being written – 
and by extension what is being done. […] [A]s an attempt to make 
the language of the state the sole legitimate medium of political 
expression, it also represents one of the most aggressive aspects of 
CCP propaganda. (Schoenhals 1992: 3)  
As Schoenhals points out, Chinese political terms contain layers of 
meaning related to party ideology, Chinese culture, and national char-
acteristics. As an example, one of the lecturers I observed pointed out 
that careless use of terminology could inadvertently cause a journalist 
to mistakenly acknowledge the legitimacy of the Japanese claim in the 
border dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea. 
Therefore, journalists should always avoid using the phrase “the mid-
dle line of the East China Sea between China and Japan” and instead 
use the longer expression “the Japanese side’s so-called ‘middle line’ 
of the Eastern Sea” to emphasise China’s disapproval of this claim.  
Protecting National Interests at Home and 
Abroad
Reporting should benefit the stability of society, help protect our 
country’s international relations and establish our country’s image, 
and promote the impact, credibility, and authority of our media’s 
international reporting. (Anonymous 7 2011) 
This statement from a lecturer’s notes to students in an international 
journalism class at Tsinghua University reveals that China’s interna-
tional media have several responsibilities to live up to. The relation-
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ship between international newsmaking and national interests was a 
core element of the teaching, both with regard to how journalists 
should portray China in international media and how international 
news issues should be reported to a Chinese audience. Lecturers em-
phasised that reporting on international issues could not be done 
without considering how the domestic audience would react. Today, 
the Chinese government’s official standpoints on international issues 
and the ways in which Chinese issues are reported in media targeted 
towards foreign audiences can have a domestic impact and push pub-
lic opinion in China away from the party line. This causes a dilemma 
for China’s international media, summed up this way by Dong:  
Protecting national interests is the most important issue for Chi-
na’s international media. That might be the reason why China is 
not popular. But sometimes either you will lose global support or 
you will lose domestic support. (Dong 2011) 
Dong asserted that China’s global media have to find “a fair and rea-
sonable way to protect national interests at home and abroad.” The 
strategic use of the media in order to guide public opinion is seen as a 
central tool for the party to maintain control within the public debate. 
This was the case with the outburst of public anger in spring 2005, 
when anti-Japanese demonstrations by Chinese people in several 
cities around the country were sparked by Japanese state approval of 
school textbooks that critics said omitted references to Japan’s ag-
gressions during the Second World War. During the 2005 anti-
Japanese demonstrations, the Chinese government succeeded in ap-
peasing the public through the mass media by initially tolerating 
strong expressions of discontent with Japan in the commercial media 
and reporting on the public demonstrations, but then eventually en-
forcing media restrictions before the anti-Japanese sentiment spiralled 
out of control, according to Stockmann’s analysis (2010).  
From my observations, lecturers distinguished between events 
that directly impact core national interests (for instance, the NATO 
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the US sale of weapons 
to Taiwan, border disputes, etc.) and events that have an indirect 
impact. The events in the latter category are those that at first sight 
do not seem to involve or affect China immediately (for instance, the 
US sub-prime mortgage crisis, climate change, the war against terror, 
etc.). In addition, lecturers adopted a strategy of heightened caution 
when dealing with various types of emergencies or “sudden events”  
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(ケਁһԦ, tufa shijian) – situations that require a relevant government 
ministry’s instructions before they can be mentioned in any media 
reports. These are all incidents that could potentially create extensive 
media attention and, therefore, demand coherence between official 
statements and media reports (for instance, natural disasters, acci-
dents involving negligence (䍓ԫһ᭵, zeren shigu), public health, pub-
lic security, national security, and minority and religious issues). This 
demonstrates that the Chinese propaganda apparatus is concerned 
with how the Chinese public reacts to such incidents. Using the 
Thoku earthquake and tsunami that hit Japan on 11 March 2011 as a 
case study, the lecturer instructed the students to balance their report-
ing with national sentiment. The timing of the Japan disaster, coming 
just one day after an earthquake had struck Yingjiang County in Yun-
nan Province, meant that special care had to be taken when reporting 
it. The class was instructed to balance all aspects of their reporting of 
the two earthquakes, even with regard to the number of reports. Al-
though the severity of the Japanese earthquake and subsequent tsu-
nami, with a death toll of more than 19,000 people and the risk of 
nuclear pollution due to the collapse of the Fukushima nuclear power 
plant, made the earthquake in Yunnan Province, with fewer than 30 
deaths and 300 injuries, appear insignificant, the lecturers stressed 
how reporting on the two “sudden events” in this example could be 
used as a vehicle to promote national cohesion and sympathy across 
nations. The students were taught that any news coverage of the two 
disasters aimed towards a domestic audience had to be sure not to 
neglect the Yunnan quake victims and that the news coverage should 
express the “heartfelt concern” of the state and the party. To attract 
domestic media attention to Yingjiang County, former premier Wen 
Jiabao paid an official visit to the site of the Yunnan earthquake on 
19 March 2011. 
It is no coincidence that China’s officials and the media paid at-
tention to the victims of the Yingjiang County earthquake in the 
midst of the much larger Japanese disaster. In class, the lecturers 
stressed that major news incidents in Japan always demand that jour-
nalists consider the reactions of audiences both at home and abroad. 
Throughout the 1990s, Japan’s aggressions towards China during the 
Second World War were systematically used as part of China’s patri-
otic education and, today, public discourse is easily incited (Shirk 
2007). The relationship between the two countries had already deteri-
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orated sharply in September 2010, when Japan arrested a Chinese 
skipper whose trawler had collided with Japanese patrol boats in dis-
puted waters. The Chinese media, therefore, have to consider domes-
tic reactions carefully and report on matters in a “highly responsible 
way” in order to maintain stability. In class, the lecturers stressed that 
reporting should seek to achieve “a positive public opinion” and to 
“improve the trust and feelings between the people of China and 
Japan.”  
Being Critical of the Foreign Media’s China 
Coverage
Born in the early 1990s, my interviewees were exposed throughout 
their schooling to the patriotic education initiatives adopted after the 
Tiananmen demonstrations in 1989. The initiatives were meant to 
stimulate a spirit of national pride, self-confidence, and socialism with 
Chinese characteristics (Wang 2008). At the same time, the students 
were well informed and interested in news and debates on corruption 
scandals, misconduct by local officials, political reforms, environmen-
tal issues, social disputes, and other similar topics that question the 
official interpretation of social issues. My interviewees would enthusi-
astically talk about the long history of China’s civilisation and its rich 
and profound culture. They also defended China’s strong position on 
the international scene. But at the same time, they expressed criticism 
of government deficiencies at local and central levels, the lack of 
openness in the Chinese government, and the negative effects of 
restrictive media policies. This meant that the students, in spite of 
their national pride, at times had trouble expressing a heartfelt ap-
proval of the Chinese leadership. Li Na tried to explain this confusion 
of feelings: 
There are a lot of [young people] who love this country, but they 
don’t necessarily think that this government can realise their ideals. 
They feel dissatisfied. They have strong patriotic feelings and hope 
that China will become strong. But they cannot stand the stupidity 
of this government. (Anonymous 2 2012) 
Compared to the average Chinese citizen, my interviewees were well 
informed about national and international news. They subscribed to 
newsfeeds from both foreign and domestic media and checked the 
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news several times a day. They enjoyed reading the New York Times, 
The Economist, and online news via the BBC’s website, and they were 
not ignorant about the differences in the ways stories are framed in 
the Western and Chinese media. My interviewees had enough 
knowledge about news reporting in the West to be familiar with the 
Western media’s tendency to prioritise negative stories – even stories 
that had the potential to damage their home nation’s international 
standing. But when it came to negative stories about China, they 
could not help but interpret this as a direct expression of Western 
hostility towards China. Their national sentiment was offended by the 
fact that the foreign media seemed blind to taking specific Chinese 
conditions (e.g. China’s economic development, huge population, and 
political system) into consideration and instead focused their report-
ing on issues that made China as a nation “lose face” to the world. 
Furthermore, they were convinced that this biased reporting in the 
Western media was to blame for the exaggerated negative image of 
China globally. Wang Sheng argued,  
There is a judgemental aspect in foreign media reports – it is like 
they are a cut above you morally and are more righteous. It is as if 
they think that they [can] judge someone who is lagging behind – 
a country that is not as good as they are. (Anonymous 3: 2012) 
Negative sentiments like these towards the foreign media’s “overly” 
critical handling of news reports on and relating to China are wide-
spread among China’s nationalist youth. One of the most prominent 
examples was CNN’s reporting of the unrest in Tibet before the 
Olympics in 2008, where Chinese netizens criticised CNN for al-
legedly intentionally cropping an image in order to show the Chinese 
military’s brutality while screening out Tibetan protesters throwing 
stones at Chinese trucks (Xinhua 2008). CNN refuted all allegations, 
but three years after the incident, my interviewees still used this ex-
ample to demonstrate the Western media’s political bias in their Chi-
na coverage. This confirms Stockmann’s (2010) argument that the 
Chinese audience in general appears to stay loyal to domestic media 
when it comes to news stories that challenge China’s core national 
interests (for instance, Tibetan demands for independence, border 
disputes, or international criticism of China in general). 
My interviewees argued that it was as if every major event was 
used as an excuse to publish stories that could portray China and the 
Chinese government in a bad light. They described this as an expres-
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sion of a “Western mindset” among foreign correspondents. Li Na 
criticised the foreign media for misusing negative stories to express a 
general critique of China: 
If you, for instance, think of pollution – Beijing has problems with 
air pollution. That is a fact. And foreign media use this fact to say 
something about China. There is nothing you can do, because it is 
the truth. It is not so that they actually condemn China. What they 
do is that they present some facts, but when you look closer you 
can see that they are actually criticising China. (Anonymous 2 
2012) 
My interviewees asserted that the foreign media tended to focus on 
the negative aspects of an event. They could not understand the angle 
or standpoint that foreign correspondents chose to report on when 
covering news stories that in my respondents’ views could only be 
positive. For example, when in 2009 the official Chinese media and 
other Chinese media celebrated the 60th anniversary of the founding 
of the People’s Republic of China in numerous positive reports, the 
foreign media did not follow suit. To the disappointment of Ji Xiu-
qing, former president Hu Jintao’s review of Chinese troops at the 
military parade was interpreted negatively by foreign correspondents: 
At the big celebration of the 60th anniversary that for China in 
general was seen as a positive event, foreign media instead de-
scribed the review of the troops as a show off – as if there was 
something suspicious about all of it. (Anonymous 4 2012) 
Over and over again, my interviewees repeated variations of the ques-
tion: “Why do foreigners misunderstand China?” They argued that if 
foreigners got to know the “real China,” they would understand that 
the country and its people are in fact not that bad at all. The students’ 
disappointment with the foreign media’s China coverage combined 
with their conviction that the world would benefit from understand-
ing China better seemed to encourage the students to improve the 
Chinese media’s international news coverage and to attract audiences 
in the West:  
China is often depicted as this big, red, dangerous dragon, but if 
foreigners get to know it, they will find out that it is actually a nice 
dragon. (Anonymous 5 2012) 
Among my interviewees there was an underlying concern that China 
lacked a credible media platform to counter the hostile Western me-
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dia discourse. Li Na was disappointed that China had not yet found 
an effective way to respond to criticism in the foreign media:  
The Chinese reports will criticise the West for not being responsi-
ble or something like that and use big words. But China will rarely 
elaborate the facts. I think that is not very effective. (Anonymous 
2 2013) 
In the following, I will discuss my interviewees’ suggestions for 
changes in the Chinese media system that would allow them to be 
responsible professionals who serve state interests, though in ways 
that conflict with what they were taught in class. 
A Responsible Professional? 
Since the MA programme ultimately is to be evaluated against its 
success in training future international media leaders who could “win 
over” foreign audiences, the programme is interwoven with interna-
tional discourse on professionalism in journalism. Lecturers used the 
terms “professional” and “responsible” to describe how journalists 
should use professional skills to report in an accurate, scientific, well-
written, and timely manner, and at the same time be loyal towards the 
party line and produce journalism that serves the state. In this way, 
they referred to the ideal-typical values of objectivity, actuality, and 
validity, but downplayed or even ignored the autonomy of journalists 
to make professional judgements and the protection of journalists’ 
rights when investigating and reporting information (Deuze 2005). By 
bending the concept of professionalism to suit the Chinese context, 
the lecturers constructed an ideal for journalists that required both an 
ideological understanding of the party line and strong journalistic 
skills. However, my interviewees’ training was not limited to the 
classroom or the Tsinghua University campus – a six-month long, 
mandatory internship linked the training to practices in the Chinese 
state media. Furthermore, throughout their studies, the students were 
encouraged to read Western media in order to learn their narrative 
style and how they framed certain topics.    
The MA programme’s specific aim of training talented media 
workers for China’s international media meant that the students evalu-
ated it on the basis of how well they thought their training would 
equip them to produce journalism that would attract foreign audi-
ences. Outside the classroom, my interviewees distanced themselves 
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to some degree from the ideological values taught in the programme. 
Instead, students created their journalistic identity by articulating 
similarities and differences between themselves, their classmates, and 
lecturers – an identification process through which they negotiated 
their individual professional values as future journalists.  
The interviews, conducted over two different periods of the sub-
jects’ studies, provide insights into how the students’ views changed 
over time regarding both what constitutes professionalism in journal-
ism and the media’s role in society. My interviewees did not see 
themselves as a threat to the party-state and they had no intention of 
changing China’s political system in any fundamental way. But this 
did not mean that they uncritically accepted the current practices in 
either the Chinese or the foreign media. Instead, they were disap-
pointed that the Chinese state media were out of sync with common 
international journalism practices and thus unable to attract foreign 
audiences. They believed that China needed a voice on the interna-
tional stage but, at the same time, they saw political considerations as 
a significant obstacle in the way of efforts to brand the Chinese media 
as a credible alternative to foreign news services. They argued that 
unless more openness and autonomy were granted to Chinese jour-
nalists, China’s international media stood no chance of competing 
with foreign international media in attracting foreign audiences. In 
the following, I will discuss my interviewees’ interpretations of what 
they perceived to be the key qualities of developing responsible media 
professionals.  
Openness
In line with what they were taught in class, my interviewees agreed 
that inspiration from media practices in the West was necessary in 
order to attract international audiences. However, their suggestions as 
to how the Chinese media might succeed in this endeavour required 
more radical changes. Both the style and content of China’s official 
media were subject to criticism among my interviewees. Li Jun ex-
pressed his frustration about having to live up to a set of ideals that 
conflicted with his own perceptions of good journalism: 
If you go and work for a party paper or an official paper, you have 
to be the mouthpiece of the party and the government. Then, you 
have to speak for them and may have to pay more attention to the 
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form and the way you report. That does not mean that the reports 
are not professional, but it might be inconsistent with the way you 
used to think. (Anonymous 6 2012) 
Li Jun argued that there were situations when journalists had to fol-
low guidelines that clashed with their own ideals in order to keep 
their job. My interviewees saw the administration’s control of the 
media as an impediment and expressed doubt that the Chinese media 
would gain more market shares internationally if changes were limited 
to adjustments in journalistic style, less coverage of meetings and 
signing ceremonies, and more reporting of issues relating to the lives 
of ordinary citizens. The changes they suggested were more pro-
found. Wang Sheng argued, 
The reason why foreign media do well is because they speak the 
truth. They tell stories, they use quotations, and they have real 
people speak out. But in Chinese news reports, it is often the gov-
ernment that speaks in the words of officials (ᇈ䈍, guanhua); there 
are no ordinary people who speak and there is no story. People of 
course get the impression that “here comes some propaganda 
again that has no truth in it.” (Anonymous 3 2012) 
My interviewees applauded journalists who shed light on unscrupu-
lous businesses, corruption, and other social issues as long as they did 
not question the legitimacy of the party-state. The students argued for 
changes both with regard to the reporting style and the autonomy of 
journalists to decide which news stories to cover. However, they did 
not question the prevailing attitude that Chinese journalists had an 
overall responsibility to pay attention to national stability. 
Autonomy
Even in the first round of interviews, my interviewees were aware of 
an alternative definition or “ideal” of professionalism that empha-
sised autonomy and allowed journalists to rely on their professional 
skills to make their own judgements in finding interesting news stories. 
However, they also accepted that, in doing so, Chinese journalists had 
to consider the overall political framework they were part of. Li Jun 
argued,  
When you do journalism, there are matters that can have a nega-
tive effect or will impact public opinion. This kind of matter ex-
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ists. And I understand that [journalists] sometimes have no choice. 
(Anonymous 6 2012) 
Before Wang Guomei had any practical experience in journalism, she 
argued that journalists should serve state interests:  
I don’t think you, as a journalist, should only work to realise your 
dream of a free media. I have a bigger dream: to use journalism to 
improve the development of this country and for the benefit of 
the Chinese people. (Anonymous 1 2012) 
Her views had changed, however, when I interviewed her again after 
she had completed her mandatory internship at CCTV’s international 
news office. She now found that her editor’s decisions conflicted at 
times with her own professional values. She now argued that allowing 
political goals to influence news criteria could be problematic, even 
when it served to improve the Chinese media’s credibility at home 
through criticism of the Western media (Anonymous 1 2013). For 
example, she was stunned when she learned that her editor wanted to 
give high priority to the story about the child sex abuse scandal in-
volving BBC television and radio personality Jimmy Savile (Anonym-
ous 1 2013). She agreed that the story definitely had news value but 
argued that there was a strong political drive behind her editor’s deci-
sion to cover a story that could portray the BBC negatively and hence 
was an opportunity to potentially discredit the foreign news media. 
On the eve of graduation, my interviewees appeared not to 
blindly accept their role as future media talents who would serve state 
interests. Instead, they questioned what they were taught and had 
experienced during their internships. The students shared the overall 
aim of protecting national interests. They agreed to use journalism to 
guide public opinion and to promote national stability, and they were 
frustrated by how the foreign media appeared to discredit China. 
However, they argued that the Chinese media’s credibility depended 
on making improvements in the areas of openness and the autonomy 
of journalists. In other words, they believed that giving journalists 
leeway to select and write news reports based on professional judge-
ment would benefit, rather than harm, China’s international image. 
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Conclusion 
The training of international media workers in China has a strong 
emphasis on the dual role of international newsmaking: guiding do-
mestic public opinion by controlling what information reaches the 
home audience and strengthening official presentations of China in 
media targeted towards foreign audiences. This confirms that China’s 
international state media are both inward- and outward-looking. This 
double role requires that journalism students are taught to both to 
master the practical skills of international journalism and to identify 
with the ideological baseline of the CCP. The students are trained to 
stay loyal to the party line, to protect national interests at home and 
abroad, and to remain critical of the foreign media’s news coverage of 
China. However, this clashes with the aim of training journalists who 
can attract foreign audiences and deliver timely and comprehensive 
news and information in an appealing manner. This apparent contra-
diction within the aims of the MA programme in international jour-
nalism and communications implies that the course cannot ignore the 
tensions between the official construct of professional ideals in jour-
nalism that require complete loyalty to the state and the party, and 
foreign audiences’ expectations that journalists have professional 
autonomy in deciding the content and style of reporting in order to 
deliver news and information in a timely, comprehensive, objective, 
and appealing way. 
My interviewees shared the overall aim of serving national inter-
ests and they were critical of the way in which the foreign media por-
trayed China. However, they did not believe that more openness and 
autonomy for journalists would pose any threat to the state. Con-
versely, they believed that China was in a position to gain from media 
reforms that would allow a free flow of information from China to 
the world and vice versa. This might indicate that after a period of 
time, my interviewees might be able to promote changes in journal-
istic practices in China as they advance in their careers. However, for 
the time being, it is evident that strong institutions continue to super-
vise and control individual journalists, particularly with regard to how 
politically sensitive news is covered at home and abroad. 
  Training Responsible Journalists in China 197 

References 
ACJA see All-China Journalists Association 
Alford, William P., and Kenneth Winston (2011), Introduction, in: 
William P. Alford, Kenneth Winston, and William Kirby (eds), 
Prospects for the Professions in China, Oxon, UK: Routledge: 1–21.  
All-China Journalists Association (2009), ѝഭᯠ䰫ᐕ֌㘵㙼ъ䚃ᗧ߶
ࡉ  (Zhongguo xinwen gongzuozhe zhiye daode zhunze, Ethical Code of 
Chinese News Workers), 27 November, online: <http://news.xin 
huanet.com/politics/2009-11/27/content_12550395_1.htm> 
(17 February 2016). 
Anonymous 1 (2012), pseudonym Wang Guomei, interview, journal-
ism student, China, Beijing, 7 January. 
Anonymous 1 (2013), pseudonym Wang Guomei, interview, journal-
ism student, China, Beijing, 7 March. 
Anonymous 2 (2012), pseudonym Li Na, interview, journalism stu-
dent, China, Beijing, 4 January. 
Anonymous 2 (2013), pseudonym Li Na, interview, journalism stu-
dent, China, Beijing, 4 March. 
Anonymous 3 (2012), pseudonym Wang Sheng, interview, journalism 
student, China, Beijing, 5 January.  
Anonymous 4 (2012), pseudonym Ji Xiuqing, interview, journalism 
student, China, Beijing, 5 January. 
Anonymous 5 (2012), pseudonym Liu An, interview, journalism stu-
dent, China, Beijing, 3 January. 
Anonymous 6 (2012), pseudonym Li Jun, interview, journalism stu-
dent, China, Beijing, 4 January. 
Anonymous 7 (2011), Lecturer’s handouts to students at Tsinghua 
University in a class of international journalism. 
Barr, Michael (2012), Nation Branding as Nation Building: China’s 
Image Campaign, in: East Asia, 29, 1, 81–94.  
Barr, Michael (2011), Who is afraid of China? The Challenge of Chinese Soft 
Power, London: Zed Books. 
Brady, Anne-Marie (ed.) (2012), China’s Thought Management, London, 
UK, and New York, NY: Routledge. 
Brady, Anne-Marie (2009), The Beijing Olympics as a Campaign of 
Mass Distraction, in: The China Quarterly, 197, 1–24.  
Chan, Man Joseph, Pan Zhongdang, and L. F. Lee Francis (2004), 
Professional Aspirations and Job Satisfaction: Chinese Journal-
  198 Laura Dombernowsky 

ists at a Time of Change in the Media, in: Journalism and Mass 
Communication Quarterly, 81, 2, 254–273. 
Chen, Ni (2011), The Evolving Chinese Government Spokesperson 
System, in: Jian Wang (ed.), Soft Power in China – Public Diplomacy 
through Communication, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 73–93.  
Deuze, Mark (2005), What is Journalism? Professional Identity and 
Ideology of Journalists Reconsidered, in: Journalism, 6, 4, 442–464. 
Dong, Guanpeng (2011), interview, Vice-president of the China Pub-
lic Relations Association and professor of Tsinghua University’s 
School of Journalism and Communication, Beijing, 28 Decem-
ber. 
Edney, Kingsley (2014), The Globalization of Chinese Propaganda: Interna-
tional Power and Domestic Political Cohesion, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Guo, Ke (2004), On Teaching of Bilingual Journalism Education in China, 
paper presented at JourNet international conference on Profes-
sional Education for the Media in Newcastle, Australia, 16–20 
February, online: <http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-URL 
_ID=19067&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.h
tml> (17 February 2016).  
Guo, Zhongshi (2010), Through Barbed Wires: Context, Content, 
and Constraints for Journalism Education in China, in: Beate Jo-
sephi (ed.), Journalism Education in Countries with Limited Media Free-
dom, New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing, 15–32. 
Hasty, Jennifer (2006), Performing Power, Composing Culture: The 
State Press in Ghana, in: Ethnography, 7, 1, 69–98.  
Li, Changchun (2010), ᵾ䮯᱕൘ѝഭՐჂབྷᆖ䈳⹄ᰦᕪ䈳࣐ᕪഭ䱵
Ր᫝ਾ༷Ӫ᡽ษޫѪᨀ儈ഭ䱵Ր᫝㜭࣋ᨀ׋ඊᇎ᭟᫁ (Li Chang-
chun zai Zhongguo chuanmei daxue diaoyan shi qiangdiao jiaqiang guoji 
chuanbo houbei rencai peiyang wei tigao guoji chuanbo nengli tigong jianshi 
zhicheng, In his speech at the Communication University of China Li 
Changchun emphasised: Strengthen the Training Talents in International 
Communication in Order to Provide Solid Support to Improve International 
Communication), 18 December, online: <http://paper.people. 
com.cn/rmrb/html/2010-12/18/nw.D110000renmrb_20101218 
_3-01.htm> (17 February 2016). 
Li, Changchun (ᵾ䮯᱕) (2008), ᵾ䮯᱕ࣚ࣋ᶴᔪ⧠ԓՐ᫝փ㌫ᨀ儈
ഭ޵ഭ䱵Ր᫝㜭࣋ (Li Changchun: Nuli goujian xiandai chuanbo 
tixi tigao guonei guoji chuanbo nengli, Li Changchun: Build a 
  Training Responsible Journalists in China 199 

Modern Communication System to Improve Domestic and In-
ternational Capability), in: People’s Daily Net, 3 December, online: 
<http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/8563595.html> (17 
February 2016). 
Lu, Yiyi (2012), Challenges for China’s International Communication, 
in: Hongyi Lai and Yiyi Lu, China’s Soft Power and International Re-
lations, London, UK, New York, NY: Routledge, 104–120. 
MFA see Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010), Getting to Know the Real China State-
ment by H. E. Wen Jiabao Premier of the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China at the General Debate of the 65th Session of the UN 
General Assembly, 23 September, online: <www.fmprc.gov.cn/ 
mfa_eng/topics_665678/wenjibaochuxi65jieUNdh_665784/t76
1353.shtml> (17 February 2016). 
Pan, Zhongdang, and Ye Lu (2003), Localizing Professionalism: Dis-
cursive Practices in China’s Media Reform, in: Chin-Chuan Lee 
(ed.), Chinese Media, Global Contexts, 210–229. 
Polumbaum, Judy (2011), Negotiating Good Work in Chinese Jour-
nalism, in: Prospects for the Professions in China, New York, NY: 
Routledge, 209–224.  
Schoenhals, Michael (1992), Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics: 
Five Studies, Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, Uni-
versity of California. 
Shirk, Susan (2007), Fragile Superpower, New York, NY: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.  
Stockmann, Daniela (2010), Who Believes Propaganda? Media Ef-
fects during the Anti-Japanese Protests in Beijing, in: The China 
Quarterly, 202, 269–289. 
Tsinghua University (2012), ␵ॾབྷᆖᯠ䰫оՐ᫝ᆖ䲒ഭ䱵ᯠ䰫Ր᫝
⺅༛亩ⴞᔰ᭮ᰕ䙊⸕  (Qinghua daxue xinwen yu chuanbo xueyuan 
guoji xinwen chuanbo shuoshi xiangmu kaifang ri tongzhi, Tsinghua Uni-
versity’s School of Journalism and Communication’s Open Day Notice of the 
MA programme in International Journalism and Communication), 8 Au-
gust, online: <www.tsjc.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/jc/239/2011/ 
20110803023359314970600/20110803023359314970600_.html> 
(17 Feburary 2016).  
Tsinghua University (2011), ᯠ䰫Ր᫝ᆖ⺅༛ษޫᯩṸ (Xinwen chuan-
boxue shuoshi peiyang fangan, Training Objectives of Masters in Journalism 
  200 Laura Dombernowsky 

and Communication Studies), Teaching Booklet for MA students at 
the School of Journalism and Communication. 
Tsinghua University (2009), ␵ॾབྷᆖ੟ࣘഭ䱵ᯠ䰫Ր᫝⺅༛亩ⴞ 
(Qinghua daxue qidong guoji xinwen chuanbo shuoshi xiangmu, Tsinghua 
University Starts MA programme in International Communication), 5 
September, online: <www.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/news/4205/ 
2011/20110225232323500102123/20110225232323500102123_.
html> (17 Feburary 2016).  
Wang, Jian (2011), Soft Power in China – Public Diplomacy through Com-
munication, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Wang, Zheng (2008), National Humiliation, History Education, and 
the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign 
in China, in: International Studies Quarterly, 52, 4, 783–806. 
Xin, Xin (2012), How the Market is Changing China’s News: The Case of 
Xinhua News Agency, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
Xinhua (2009), ␵ॾབྷᆖ੟ࣘഭ䱵ᯠ䰫Ր᫝⺅༛亩ⴞษޫ儈ㄟཆᇓӪ
᡽ (Qinghua daxue qidong guoji xinwen chuanbo shuoshi xiang-
mu peiyang gaoduan wai xuan rencai, Tsinghua University Starts 
MA programme in International Journalism and Communication 
Fostering Top Talents in International Propaganda), 6 Septem-
ber, online: <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-09/06/ 
content_12004429.htm> (17 Feburary 2016).  
Xinhua (2008), Netizens Slam CNN’s Distortion of Riot Picture, 23 
March, online: <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/ 
23/content_7841316.htm> (17 Feburary 2016).  
Yong Z. Volz, and Chin-Chuan Lee (2009), American Pragmatism 
and Chinese Modernization: Importing the Missouri Model of 
Journalism Education to Modern China, in: Media Culture Society, 
31, 5, 711–730, online: <http://mcs.sagepub.com/content/31/ 
5/711.full.pdf> (17 February 2016). 
  Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 3/2016:  1–2 
Contents
Non-Traditional Security in Sino–Indian Relations 
Introduction 
       Sebastian BIBA 
New Concerns, More Cooperation? How Non-
Traditional Security Issues Affect Sino–Indian 
Relations 3
Research Articles 
      Jingdong YUAN 
Sino–Indian Economic Ties since 1988: Progress, 
Problems, and Prospects for Future Development 31
      Andrew F. COOPER and Asif B. FAROOQ 
The Role of China and India in the G20 and BRICS: 
Commonalities or Competitive Behaviour? 73
       Olivia GIPPNER 
Antipiracy and Unusual Coalitions in the Indian Ocean 
Region: China’s Changing Role and Confidence  
Building with India 107
       David SCOTT 
Buddhism in Current China–India Diplomacy 139
Research Articles 
      Laura DOMBERNOWSKY 
Training Responsible Journalists in China: Guiding 
Domestic Opinion, Gaining Foreign Audiences 175
      Huisheng SHOU and Gary S. GREEN 
The Political Economy of Organisational Violence in 
Chinese Industry 201
  2 Contents 
Contributors 231
Article Index 2016 233
 
